Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria

Inkoo Cho and David Kreps

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987, vol. 102, issue 2, 179-221

Abstract: Games in which one party conveys private information to a second through messages typically admit large numbers of sequential equilibria, as the second party may entertain a wealth of beliefs in response to out-of-equilibrium messages. By restricting those out-of-equilibrium beliefs, one can sometimes eliminate many unintuitive equilibria. We present a number of formal restrictions of this sort, investigate their behavior in specific examples, and relate these restrictions to Kohlberg and Mertens' notion of stability.

Date: 1987
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Working Paper: Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria (1997)
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