Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example

Francoise Forges

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1990, vol. 105, issue 2, 375-398

Abstract: We study (costless) information transmission from a job applicant to an employer who must decide whether to hire him and, if so, which position to give him. We construct equilibrium payoffs requiring at least two signaling steps, or even that no deadline be imposed on the (plain) conversation. The set of communication equilibrium payoffs (achieved with the help of a communication device) is larger than the set of equilibrium payoffs of the plain conversation game but coincides with the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs.

Date: 1990
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