EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Strikes and Wages: A Test of an Asymmetric Information Model

David Card

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1990, vol. 105, issue 3, 625-659

Abstract: This paper describes a simple model of labor disputes based on the hypothesis that unions use strikes to infer the profitability of the firm. The model posits the existence of a negatively sloped resistance curve between wages and strike duration. In addition, it offer a series of predictions relating wage and strike outcomes to changes in the expected profitability of the firm and changes in the alternative opportunities of striking workers. These implications are tested using data on wage outcomes, strike probabilities, and strike durations for a large sample of collective bargaining agreements.

Date: 1990
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (57)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2937893 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:105:y:1990:i:3:p:625-659.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

The Quarterly Journal of Economics is currently edited by Robert J. Barro, Lawrence F. Katz, Nathan Nunn, Andrei Shleifer and Stefanie Stantcheva

More articles in The Quarterly Journal of Economics from President and Fellows of Harvard College
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-22
Handle: RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:105:y:1990:i:3:p:625-659.