The Politics of Ambiguity

Alberto Alesina and Alex Cukierman

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1990, vol. 105, issue 4, 829-850

Abstract: Politicians face a trade-off between the policies that maximize their chances of reelection and their most preferred policies (or the policies most preferred by the constituency which they represent). This paper analyzes this trade-off in a dynamic electoral model in which the voters are not fully informed about the preferences of the incumbent. First, we show that the incumbent follows a policy which is intermediate between the other party's ideal policy and his own ideal policy. Second, we show that, often, the incumbent has an incentive to choose procedures which make it difficult for voters to pinpoint his preferences with absolute precision. Thus, politicians may prefer to be "ambiguous."

Date: 1990
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Working Paper: The Politics of Ambiguity (1990)
Working Paper: The Politics of Ambiguity (1987)
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