Testing for Contracting Effects on Employment

Mark Bils

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1991, vol. 106, issue 4, 1129-1156

Abstract: I test for the importance of wage rigidities from long-term contracts by observing how employment responds when firms and workers recontract. If rigidities are important, then employment should adjust after recontracting to partially undo its movements during the past contract. I examine twelve manufacturing industries that display a strong bargaining pattern. I find employment does rebound after recontracting, particularly in motor vehicles. This implies that contract rigidities are important. I also find responses in wage growth at the beginning of new contracts; but these responses are not related to the pattern of employment responses across industries.

Date: 1991
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Working Paper: Testing for Contracting Effects on Employment (1989)
Working Paper: TESTING FOR CONTRACTING EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT (1989)
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