Negotiated Trade Restrictions with Private Political Pressure

Robert Feenstra and Tracy Lewis

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1991, vol. 106, issue 4, 1287-1307

Abstract: We consider a home government with political pressure to restrict trade. The foreign country is compensated with a portion of the tariff revenues or quota rents, but cannot directly observe the political pressure abroad. In this setting, the two countries negotiate over the volume of trade and transfer of rents, depending on the level of political pressure. We determine globally optimal, incentive-compatible trade policies, in which the home government has no incentive to overstate (or understate) the pressure for protection.

Date: 1991
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (60)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2937965 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Negotiated Trade Restrictions with Private Political Pressure (1987)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:106:y:1991:i:4:p:1287-1307.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

The Quarterly Journal of Economics is currently edited by Robert J. Barro, Lawrence F. Katz, Nathan Nunn, Andrei Shleifer and Stefanie Stantcheva

More articles in The Quarterly Journal of Economics from President and Fellows of Harvard College
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().