Corruption

Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1993, vol. 108, issue 3, 599-617

Abstract: This paper presents two propositions about corruption. First, the structure of government institutions and of the political process are very important determinants of the level of corruption. In particular, weak governments that do not control their agencies experience very high corruption levels. Second, the illegality of corruption and the need for secrecy make it much more distortionary and costly than its sister activity, taxation. These results may explain why, in some less developed countries, corruption is so high and so costly to development.

Date: 1993
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (59)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2118402 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Corruption (1993)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:108:y:1993:i:3:p:599-617.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

The Quarterly Journal of Economics is currently edited by Robert J. Barro, Lawrence F. Katz, Nathan Nunn, Andrei Shleifer and Stefanie Stantcheva

More articles in The Quarterly Journal of Economics from President and Fellows of Harvard College
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().