The Management of Innovation

Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994, vol. 109, issue 4, 1185-1209

Abstract: The paper analyzes the organization of the R&D activity in an incomplete contract framework. It provides theoretical foundations: (a) to understand how the allocation of property rights on innovations may affect both the frequency and the magnitude of these innovations; (b) to rationalize commonly observed features in research employment contracts, such as shop rights, trailer clauses, and the "hired for" doctrine; (c) to discuss the robustness of the so-called Schumpeterian hypotheses to endogenizing the organization of R&D; and (d) to provide a rationale for

Date: 1994
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (535)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2118360 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: On the Management of Innovation (1994)
Working Paper: On the Management of Innovation (1993)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:109:y:1994:i:4:p:1185-1209.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

The Quarterly Journal of Economics is currently edited by Robert J. Barro, Lawrence F. Katz, Nathan Nunn, Andrei Shleifer and Stefanie Stantcheva

More articles in The Quarterly Journal of Economics from President and Fellows of Harvard College
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().