The High Unemployment Trap

Gilles Saint-Paul

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1995, vol. 110, issue 2, 527-550

Abstract: A model of the labor market under firing restrictions and endogenous quits is constructed. It is shown that in the spirit of Blanchard and Summers, the model can generate multiple equilibria for plausible parameter values, with a low quits/high unemployment equilibrium coexisting with a high quits/low unemployment equilibrium.

Date: 1995
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Related works:
Working Paper: The High Unemployment Trap (1992)
Working Paper: THE HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT TRAP (1991)
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