Ideology, Tactics, and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics

Avinash Dixit and John Londregan

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1998, vol. 113, issue 2, 497-529

Abstract: We model the electoral politics of redistribution when voters and parties care about inequality in addition to their private concerns for consumption and votes, respectively. Ideological concerns about income redistribution lead each party to adopt a general proportional income tax, adjusted to appeal to the ideological leanings of high "clout" groups, with disproportionately many "swing" voters, which the parties also ply with pork-barrel projects. Our results relate to "Director's Law," which says that redistributive politics favors middle classes at the expense of both rich and poor.

Date: 1998
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Working Paper: Ideology, Tactics, and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics (1997)
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