The Economics of Roscas and Intrahousehold Resource Allocation

Siwan Anderson and Jean-Marie Baland

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002, vol. 117, issue 3, 963-995

Abstract: This paper investigates individual motives to participate in rotating savings and credit associations (roscas). Detailed evidence from roscas in a Kenyan slum (Nairobi) suggests that most roscas are predominantly composed of women, particularly those living in a couple and earning an independent income. We propose an explanation of this based on conflictual interactions within the household. Participation in a rosea is a strategy a wife employs to protect her savings against claims by her husband for immediate consumption. The empirical implications of the model are then tested using the data collected in Kenya.

Date: 2002
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