Bad Reputation

Jeffrey Ely and Juuso Välimäki

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003, vol. 118, issue 3, 785-814

Abstract: We construct a model where the reputational concern of the long-run player to look good in the current period results in the loss of all surplus. This is in contrast to the bulk of the literature on reputations where such considerations mitigate myopic incentive problems. We also show that in models where all parties have long-run objectives, such losses can be avoided.

Date: 2003
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Working Paper: Bad Reputation (2002)
Working Paper: Bad Reputation (2002)
Working Paper: Bad Reputation (2002)
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