A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics

Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2005, vol. 120, issue 4, 1239-1282

Abstract: We develop a novel model of campaigns, elections, and policy-making in which the ex ante objectives of national party leaders differ from the ex post objectives of elected legislators. This generates a distinction between "policy rhetoric" and "policy reality" and introduces an important role for "party discipline" in the policy-making process. We identify a protectionist bias in majoritarian politics. When trade policy is chosen by the majority delegation and legislators in the minority have limited means to influence choices, the parties announce trade policies that favor specific factors, and the expected tariff or export subsidy is positive. Positions and expected outcomes monotonically approach free trade as party discipline strengthens.

Date: 2005
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Working Paper: A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics (2005)
Working Paper: A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics (2004)
Working Paper: A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics (2004)
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