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The Vulnerability of Auctions to Bidder Collusion

Robert C. Marshall and Leslie Marx

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2009, vol. 124, issue 2, 883-910

Abstract: Previous work has addressed the relative vulnerability of different auction schemes to collusive bidding. The common wisdom is that ascending-bid and second-price auctions are highly susceptible to collusion. We show that the details of ascending-bid and second-price auctions, including bidder registration procedures and procedures for information revelation during the auction, can be designed to completely inhibit, or unintentionally facilitate, certain types of collusion. If auctions are designed without acknowledging the possibility of collusion then the design will ignore key features that impact the potential success of colluding bidders.

Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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The Quarterly Journal of Economics is currently edited by Robert J. Barro, Lawrence F. Katz, Nathan Nunn, Andrei Shleifer and Stefanie Stantcheva

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