Comparing open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions

Susan Athey, Jonathan Levin and Enrique Seira

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2011, vol. 126, issue 1, 207-257

Abstract: We study entry and bidding patterns in sealed bid and open auctions. Using data from the U.S. Forest Service timber auctions, we document a set of systematic effects: sealed bid auctions attract more small bidders, shift the allocation toward these bidders, and can also generate higher revenue. A private value auction model with endogenous participation can account for these qualitative effects of auction format. We estimate the model's parameters and show that it can explain the quantitative effects as well. We then use the model to assess bidder competitiveness, which has important consequences for auction design. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2011
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Working Paper: Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions (2008)
Working Paper: Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions (2008)
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