Cooperation in Strategic Games Revisited
Adam Kalai and
Ehud Kalai
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2013, vol. 128, issue 2, 917-966
Abstract:
For two-person complete-information strategic games with transferable utility, all major variable-threat bargaining and arbitration solutions coincide. This confluence of solutions by luminaries such as Nash, Harsanyi, Raiffa, and Selten, is more than mere coincidence. Staying in the class of two-person games with transferable unility, the article presents a more complete theory that expands their solution. Specifically, it presents: (1) a decomposition of a game into cooperative and competitive components, (2) an intuitive and computable closed-form formula for the solution, (3) an axiomatic justification of the solution, and (4) a generalization of the solution to games with private signals, along with an arbitration scheme that implements it. The objective is to restart research on cooperative solutions to strategic games and their applications. JEL Codes: C71, C72, C78. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.
Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/qje/qjs074 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:128:y:2013:i:2:p:917-966
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals
Access Statistics for this article
The Quarterly Journal of Economics is currently edited by Robert J. Barro, Lawrence F. Katz, Nathan Nunn, Andrei Shleifer and Stefanie Stantcheva
More articles in The Quarterly Journal of Economics from President and Fellows of Harvard College
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().