 The Trust ProblemE. Dana Durand The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1914, vol. 28, issue 3, 381-416 Abstract: I. Introductory. Definitions of trust, pool, industrial combination, 382. — Theory that elimination of unfair competition and special privileges would rob combinations of monopoly power, 383. — Difficulty of proof or disproof from experience, 385. — Power of pools to advance prices, 389. — Trust prices, 390. — Oil, sugar, tobacco and steel trusts, 391. — Unfair competitive methods and special privileges not sufficient explanation of monopoly power, 393. — The power of combinations as such to maintain monopoly prices, 395. — Theoretical reasoning on the probable influence of combination and the impossibility of competition, 396. — Consequent necessity of regulation or prohibition, 400. II. Possibility of preventing combination, 402. — Success of certain Federal cases against combinations, 402. — Deterrent effect of more severe penalties, 404. — Reasons for failure of certain trust dissolutions to restore competition, 405. — Possibility of destroying and preventing formal trusts and pools, 408. — Weakness of informal understandings, 410. Date: 1914 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:28:y:1914:i:3:p:381-416. Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article The Quarterly Journal of Economics is currently edited by Robert J. Barro, Lawrence F. Katz, Nathan Nunn, Andrei Shleifer and Stefanie Stantcheva More articles in The Quarterly Journal of Economics from President and Fellows of Harvard College |
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