The Trust Problem

E. Dana Durand

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1914, vol. 28, issue 4, 664-700

Abstract: III. Difficulty of limiting the number and scope of trusts under a policy of regulation, 665. — Regulation implies fixing of prices or profits, or both, 668. — Difficulties of cost accounting, 670; of fluctuations in demand, 671. — Railroad regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission proves nothing for trust regulation, 672. — The policy a stepping stone to socialism, 675. IV. The alleged advantages of combinations, 677. — Desire to secure monopoly and promoter's profits in fact the cause of combinations, 678. — A monopolistic combination not necessarily more efficient than a limited one, 679. — Inductive evidence inconclusive, 680.General reasoning, on advantages from magnitude of operations, 685; from combination as such, 686; from elimination of competition, 689. — Monopoly tends to stagnation, 695. — Summary of conclusions, 696.

Date: 1914
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