Monopoly or Competition as the Basis of a Government Trust Policy

Robert Liefmann

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1915, vol. 29, issue 2, 308-325

Abstract: The problem must be attacked on grounds of theory, 308. — Maximum satisfaction and the law of the equalization of marginal return, 311. — Monopoly and competition not antagonistic, but supplementary, 315. — The endeavor to suppress combinations misdirected and futile, 318. — Competition leads to overcapitalization, i. e., excessive capital investment, in certain industries, 321. — Existing Kartells do not represent advantageous monopolistic organization, 322. — Criticism of the American trust legislation of 1914, 324.

Date: 1915
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