Some Economic Implications of Unemployment Insurance

Dale Yoder

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1931, vol. 45, issue 4, 622-639

Abstract: I. Recent proposals for unemployment insurance require special consideration, 622.—II. Systems established voluntarily by employers are practical only under certain conditions, 624.—III. Profits and surpluses not a suitable source of unemployment insurance funds, 626.—Nor employers' gains resulting from the lag of money wages, 629.—Doubtful whether unemployment insurance will pay for itself through increased productivity, 630.—IV. Compulsory contributions to unemployment funds tend to fall upon wage-earners, 633; and not likely to lead to reduction of unemployment, 634.—V. Direct government subsidies the proper method, 639.

Date: 1931
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/1883247 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:45:y:1931:i:4:p:622-639.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

The Quarterly Journal of Economics is currently edited by Robert J. Barro, Lawrence F. Katz, Nathan Nunn, Andrei Shleifer and Stefanie Stantcheva

More articles in The Quarterly Journal of Economics from President and Fellows of Harvard College
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().