Ownership and Compensation as Incentives to Corporation Executives

R. A. Gordon

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1940, vol. 54, issue 3, 455-473

Abstract: I. The problem, 455. — II. Sample and data: 149 out of 200 largest (1929) non-financial firms for which data are available, 457; basis for selecting executives for study, 457; sources and quality of data, 458. — III. Stockholdings: value and dividends, 460. — IV. Executive compensation, 465. — V. The various incentives compared, 466. — VI. Summary and conclusion, 470.

Date: 1940
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