Tariff Aspects of a Federal Union

John S. de Beers

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1941, vol. 56, issue 1_Part_1, 49-92

Abstract: I. Introduction: federal unions and customs unions, 49. — II. Long-run economic consequences, 51. — Revenue tariff, 54. — Moderate protection, 61. — Extreme protection, 64. — Tentative conclusions: conditions making for economic gain by country granting preferential tariff reductions, 66; economic benefits may be reduced or cancelled by policy of self-sufficiency, 70. — III. Transitional economic problems: Streit's proposal, 71; Meade's suggestions, 74; Salter's plan, 75; regional groups, 76; formula to assure permanent gain, 79. — IV. The most-favored nation clause, 80. — V. The tariff authority, 88. — VI. Conclusions, 91.

Date: 1941
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