Forward Shifting of a Payroll Tax Under Monopolistic Competition

Sam Arnold

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1947, vol. 61, issue 2, 267-284

Abstract: I. The incentive argument for merit rating, 267. — Definitions, 268. — II. Monopoly profit before and after the imposition of contribution costs, 269. — Implications for forward shifting of contribution costs, 270. — III. Adequacy of profit reductions, 274. — Effect of different contribution rates upon a given monopolist, 274. — Effects of elasticities of demand and slopes of marginal cost functions, 276. — Conclusions, 283.

Date: 1947
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/1880669 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:61:y:1947:i:2:p:267-284.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

The Quarterly Journal of Economics is currently edited by Robert J. Barro, Lawrence F. Katz, Nathan Nunn, Andrei Shleifer and Stefanie Stantcheva

More articles in The Quarterly Journal of Economics from President and Fellows of Harvard College
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().