"Bargaining Power" in Price and Wage Determination

Charles E. Lindblom

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1948, vol. 62, issue 3, 396-417

Abstract: Misunderstanding in the use of the concept: explicit definitions, 396; implicit definitions, 397; criticism of these, 398. — Bargaining power and its effect on price: perfect competition, 400; agreement, 401; major determinants of power, 402; difficulties of definition, 403. — False antithesis between bargaining power and competitive market forces: the bargaining theory of wages, 408; theoretical indeterminateness, 410. — Inequality in power relative to time, direction and magnitude of price movement, 411. — Critique of alternative treatments of bargaining power: Dunlop, 413; Slichter, 414; Shister, 414. — Conclusions, 417.

Date: 1948
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