On the Theory of Price Agreements
Hans Brems
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1951, vol. 65, issue 2, 252-262
Abstract:
I. Introduction, 252. — II. Assumptions, 253. — III. The duopolists' hypotheses about rival behavior, 255. — IV. The duopolists' maximum effective, expected profits, 257. — V. Minimum requirements of A and B confronted, 258. — VI. Chances for agreement, 258. — VII. The result of bargaining, 260. — VIII. Lesson on bargaining techniques, 260.
Date: 1951
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/1879536 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:65:y:1951:i:2:p:252-262.
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals
Access Statistics for this article
The Quarterly Journal of Economics is currently edited by Robert J. Barro, Lawrence F. Katz, Nathan Nunn, Andrei Shleifer and Stefanie Stantcheva
More articles in The Quarterly Journal of Economics from President and Fellows of Harvard College
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().