The Role of Conflict in Economic Decision-Making Groups: Some Empirical Results

Joseph L. Bower

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1965, vol. 79, issue 2, 263-277

Abstract: I. Introduction, 263. — II. Developments in normative group decision theory, 264. — III. Questions and an experiment, 267; assumption of a group of rational individuals, 267; two experimental problems: the rational team and the foundation, 268. — IV. The results, 271. — V. Summary and conclusions, 276.

Date: 1965
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