Avarice, Altruism, and Second Party Preferences

Robert Haney Scott

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1972, vol. 86, issue 1, 1-18

Abstract: The shape of a preference function when one individual's utility depends not only upon his own rate of consumption, but also upon his neighbor's rate of consumption — second party preferences, 2. — Definitions of avaricious, altruistic, and egalitarian sentiment, 4. — Division of a fixed supply of commodities between two individuals, 6. — The maximum mazimorum of satisfaction when any move from an equilibrium position leaves all parties worse off, 12. — Some implications for welfare policies and programs, 15.

Date: 1972
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