Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

Mark V. Pauly

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1974, vol. 88, issue 1, 44-62

Abstract: I. The competitive allocation of insurance under moral hazard, 45. — II. "Competitive" equilibrium, 50. — III. Moral hazard and public provision, 52. — IV. Adverse selection and the competitive market, 54. — V. Alternative devices for dealing with adverse selection and moral hazard from overinsurance, 60.

Date: 1974
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