Takeovers, Shareholder Returns, and the Theory of the Firm

Michael Firth

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1980, vol. 94, issue 2, 235-260

Abstract: The paper examines recent merger and takeover activity in the United Kingdom. Specifically, the impact of takeovers on shareholder returns and management benefits is analyzed, and some implications for the theory of the firm are drawn from the results. The research showed that mergers and takeovers resulted in benefits to the acquired firms' shareholders and to the acquiring companies' managers, but that losses were suffered by the acquiring companies' shareholders. The results are consistent with takeovers being motivated more by maximization of management utility reasons, than by the maximization of shareholder wealth.

Date: 1980
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (57)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/1884539 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:94:y:1980:i:2:p:235-260.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

The Quarterly Journal of Economics is currently edited by Robert J. Barro, Lawrence F. Katz, Nathan Nunn, Andrei Shleifer and Stefanie Stantcheva

More articles in The Quarterly Journal of Economics from President and Fellows of Harvard College
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().