A Theory of Legislative Organization: Making the Most of Your Majority

Arleen Leibowitz and Robert Tollison

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1980, vol. 94, issue 2, 261-277

Abstract: In this paper we seek to explain why legislative committees exist and what is the optimal number and size of committees in a legislature. Our theory is based on the idea that committees are a "sample" taken from the full house and on the assumption that the majority party seeks to maximize the proportion of its favored bills which are reviewed and passed in voting trials. We show that for a given size of majority fewer and larger committees lead to larger passage rates, if majority members do not always vote the party-line.

Date: 1980
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