Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
Andreu Mas-Colell
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1980, vol. 94, issue 4, 625-641
Abstract:
Some basic facts of public goods theory are presented in the primitive set-up of a collection of projects devoid of any linear structure. There is a single private good. Characterizations of Pareto optimal and core states in terms of valuation functions (i.e. supporting "prices") are obtained. Voluntary financing schemes are discussed.
Date: 1980
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