On Oligopolistic Markets for Nonrenewable Natural Resources

Tracy Lewis and Richard Schmalensee

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1980, vol. 95, issue 3, 475-491

Abstract: Noncooperative oligopoly behavior in nonrenewable resource markets is analyzed under stationary conditions assuming perfect information. The existence of Cournot-Nash equilibria in output paths is established under standard cost and demand assumptions, and a number of comparative dynamic results are obtained. If all suppliers have the same costs, for instance, and total reserves are fixed, either increasing the number of suppliers or equalizing their reserve holdings causes more rapid resource use. If suppliers' costs differ, it is shown that equilibrium involves inefficient production; high-cost reserves may even be exhausted before low-cost reserves.

Date: 1980
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