International Liquidity: A Welfare Analysis

Michael Jones

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1983, vol. 98, issue 1, 1-23

Abstract: The paper addresses the effects of international liquidity conventions on the conduct and success of short-run income stabilization. Two interdependent and noncooperative nations attempt to minimize output variance subject to the international convention that adequate international reserve stocks be maintained. We demonstrate that the Nash outcome of nations which are bound by international reserve constraints is Pareto superior to the Nash outcome of unconstrained nations. With a formal model, we derive the set of Pareto-optimal liquidity conventions and explore the sensitivity of this set to the macroeconomic structural and stochastic characteristics of the nations and to the stabilization instruments that are employed.

Date: 1983
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