Incentives for Information Production and Disclosure in a Duopolistic Environment

Dov Fried

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1984, vol. 99, issue 2, 367-381

Abstract: This paper examines the nature of the equilibrium solution to the duopoly problem under various "incomplete" information structures and the incentives to produce and disclose information. Attention is focused on the duopolists' cost functions. The results indicate that disclosure of such information is generally beneficial to the duopolists.

Date: 1984
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (56)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/1885531 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:99:y:1984:i:2:p:367-381.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

The Quarterly Journal of Economics is currently edited by Robert J. Barro, Lawrence F. Katz, Nathan Nunn, Andrei Shleifer and Stefanie Stantcheva

More articles in The Quarterly Journal of Economics from President and Fellows of Harvard College
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().