Hard Marriage with Heavy Burdens: Organized Labor as Takeover Deterrents

Length of service and layoffs in union and non-union work groups

Xuan Tian and Wenyu Wang

The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 2021, vol. 10, issue 2, 306-346

Abstract: We examine how labor power affects a firm’s takeover exposure and merger gains. Using a regression discontinuity design that relies on “locally” exogenous variation in labor power generated by close-call union elections, we find that increased labor power significantly reduces a firm’s takeover exposure, reduces target offer premium and announcement returns, and prolongs deal completion duration. The results are stronger for more powerful and conflict-provoking unions. Bidders of unionized targets are experienced, are tough negotiators, and face fewer union threats by themselves. Our paper provides new insights into the real effects of shareholder-employee conflict regarding the market for corporate control. (JEL G34, G30, J51)Received: February 9, 2019; editorial decision January 15, 2020 by Editor Isil Erel. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Date: 2021
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