The Financial Crisis of 2007–2009: Why Did It Happen and What Did We Learn?

Anjan Thakor (thakor@wustl.edu)

The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 2015, vol. 4, issue 2, 155-205

Abstract: This review of the literature on the 2007–2009 crisis discusses the precrisis conditions, the crisis triggers, the crisis events, the real effects, and the policy responses to the crisis. The precrisis conditions contributed to the housing price bubble and the subsequent price decline that led to a counterparty-risk crisis in which liquidity shrank due to insolvency concerns. The policy responses were influenced both by the initial belief that it was a market-wide liquidity crunch and the subsequent learning that insolvency risk was a major driver. I suggest directions for future research and possible regulatory changes.

Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (37)

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