Revisiting the Taper Tantrum: A Case for International Monetary Policy Coordination

Kanad Bagchi

Journal of Financial Regulation, 2017, vol. 3, issue 2, 280-289

Abstract: The article seeks to argue for a rules-based system for international monetary policy coordination as a means to achieve optimal global policy outcomes and to contain the externalities emanating from expansive monetary policies. The article articulates its position in the context of the ‘‘taper tantrum’’ of 2013 which heightened macroeconomic stability concerns in emerging market economies, especially India. It argues for the need and relevance of monetary coordination in the international sphere and concludes on a note which broadly chalks out a path in achieving the same.

Keywords: central bank; coordination; spillovers; unconventional monetary policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:refreg:v:3:y:2017:i:2:p:280-289.

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