The Economics of Enforcing Emissions Markets

John Stranlund ()

Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2017, vol. 11, issue 2, 227-246

Abstract: This article reviews the economic literature on enforcing emissions permit markets. This literature has produced hypotheses about firms’ compliance choices and permit market outcomes, tests of these hypotheses with economic experiments, and insights about the efficient design of enforcement strategies for emissions markets. The findings of the literature are used to identify lessons concerning enforcement and compliance in international markets that are aimed at controlling greenhouse gases.

JEL-codes: K42 L51 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/reep/rex009 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:renvpo:v:11:y:2017:i:2:p:227-246.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Environmental Economics and Policy is currently edited by Robert Stavins

More articles in Review of Environmental Economics and Policy from Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().