Competition and Tying in Agrichemical and Seed Markets

David Hennessy and Dermot Hayes

Review of Agricultural Economics, 2000, vol. 22, issue 2, 389-406

Abstract: Genetic engineering technologies that better align crop seeds with field crop product demands and with other crop inputs are rapidly entering commercial markets. Central to the success of these new technologies are corporate strategies on product market segmentation and input interactions. Input suppliers possessed of technical advantages may seek to exploit their positions through marketing restrictions such as product tying and bundling. We interpret the economic literature on vertical restraints and use these existing results to understand the motivation and behavior of some of the participants in the evolving glyphosate and Roundup-ready soybean seed markets.

Date: 2000
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Working Paper: Competition and Tying in Agri-Chemical and Seed Markets (2000)
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