A Classroom Experiment about Tradable Permits

Maureen Kilkenny

Review of Agricultural Economics, 2000, vol. 22, issue 2, 586-606

Abstract: This article describes an experimental market designed for undergraduate classes in agricultural economics, environmental economics, public finance, or rural development. The experiment is a series of double-oral auctions that demonstrate private and social costs, externalities and market failures, and the efficiency of tradable permits relative to Pigouvian taxes. The novel feature is the non-pecuniary way that the negative production externality is mimicked in the classroom experiment. Details, instructions, and suggestions for how to tailor the experiment for different classes or purposes are included.

Date: 2000
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