Trade Reform and the Corn Market: Prospects for the World Trade Organization Negotiations on Agriculture

Jeff King

Review of Agricultural Economics, 2001, vol. 23, issue 1, 47-67

Abstract: Government support and trade restrictions on agricultural commodities are among the most globally distorting protectionist policies. This is especially true with regards to corn. Vast production subsidies and import barriers, primarily within the European Union and China, have artificially inflated the global supply of this commodity, while restricting the available consumer markets. This impact is augmented by the preferential treatment granted in these countries to the production and importation of the best available substitute to corn, soybeans. Using an econometric model with commodity data over the past 20 years, this article predicts the likely impact of potential World Trade Organization (WTO) trade pacts on these corn trade distortions. Despite the WTO setbackin Seattle, the vast global benefits resulting from agricultural trade liberalization in corn alone validate a continued push towards freer trade.

Date: 2001
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