Contract Structure and Design in Identity-Preserved Soybean Production

Michael Sykuta and Joe Parcell ()

Review of Agricultural Economics, 2003, vol. 25, issue 2, 332-350

Abstract: This paper provides a survey of contract design structures in identity-preserved soybean production. Drawing from economic theories of contract and organizational design, we document the allocation of value and decision rights associated with the transaction and the resulting allocation of risk associated with various sources of uncertainty for a sample of contracts for identity-preserved (or segregated) soybeans. We also list several hypotheses and avenues for future research suggested by the contract terms discussed in the paper.

Date: 2003
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