Understanding New Cooperative Models: An Ownership–Control Rights Typology

Fabio R. Chaddad and Michael L. Cook

Review of Agricultural Economics, 2004, vol. 26, issue 3, 348-360

Abstract: This article examines new agricultural cooperative organizational models from an ownership rights perspective. The article adopts a definition of ownership rights comprising both residual claim and control rights. We argue that new cooperative organizational models differ in how ownership rights are assigned to the economic agents (members, patrons, and investors) tied contractually to the firm. The article proposes a typology of discrete organizational models, in which the traditional cooperative structure and the investor-oriented firm are characterized as polar forms. The typology also includes five nontraditional models that cooperatives may adopt to ameliorate perceived financial constraints. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2004
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