Principals, agents and contracts

Chris Caswill

Science and Public Policy, 2003, vol. 30, issue 5, 337-346

Abstract: Research Funding Organisations (RFOs) in the public sector are intermediaries between the state and academic research. Principal-agent theory has been used to illuminate the relations between RFOs and state institutions. This paper explores the extension of principal-agent concepts to the study of relations between RFOs and academic research, through analysis of the awards made to researchers and their institutions by nine RFOs in six countries, as well as one supranational RFO. This analysis reveals generic similarities within the expected variety. One common feature is that RFO awards are contracts for the delegation of resources. Their embedded characteristics offer new opportunities for the study of science policy and practice. Copyright , Beech Tree Publishing.

Date: 2003
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