A game theory analysis of how research organisations adapt their behaviour in the New Zealand competitively funded science system

Sean Devine and Colin Webb

Science and Public Policy, 2004, vol. 31, issue 5, 407-414

Abstract: The New Zealand Government has reformed the way it invests in scientific research by establishing a Foundation to purchase research outputs competitively. However, competition alone does not seem able to deliver the national benefits expected of research, as some key behavioural characteristics have not emerged among research organisations. This paper, using a game theory approach, analyses why this might be and outlines how these key behaviours can be encouraged. Copyright , Beech Tree Publishing.

Date: 2004
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