 Unitary versus Collective Models of the Household: Is It Time to Shift the Burden of Proof?Alderman, Harold, et al
The World Bank Research Observer, 1995, vol. 10, issue 1, 1-19 Abstract: Most development objectives focus on the well-being of individuals. Policies are targeted to increase the percentage of individuals who avoid poverty, who can read, who are free from hunger and illness, or who can find gainful employment. Individual welfare, however, is based in large part on a complex set of interactions among family members. Until recently most policy analyses implicitly viewed the household as having only one set of preferences. This assumption has been a powerful tool for understanding household behavior, such as the distribution of tasks and goods. But a growing body of evidence suggests that this view is an expedience that comes at considerable, and possibly avoidable, cost. The article argues that more effective policy instruments will emerge from analyzing the processes by which households balance the diverse interests of their members. Coauthors are Pierre-Andre Chiappori, Lawrence Haddad, John Hoddinott, and Ravi Kanbur. Copyright 1995 by Oxford University Press. Date: 1995 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:wbrobs:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:1-19 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article The World Bank Research Observer is currently edited by Peter Lanjouw More articles in The World Bank Research Observer from World Bank Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC. |
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