Judicial Reform

Juan Carlos Botero, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes (), Andrei Shleifer and Alexander Volokh

The World Bank Research Observer, 2003, vol. 18, issue 1, 61-88

Abstract: A review of the evidence on judicial reform across countries shows that those seeking to improve economic performance should not focus on judicial efficiency alone but on independence as well. It also shows that the level of resources poured into the judicial system and the accessibility of the system have little impact on judicial performance. Most of the problem of judicial stagnation stems from inadequate incentives and overly complicated procedures. Incentive-oriented reforms that seek to increase accountability, competition, and choice seem to be the most effective in tackling the problem. But incentives alone do not correct systematic judicial failure. Chronic judicial stagnation calls for simplifying procedures and increasing their flexibility. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2003
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