Do Board Characteristics Affect Bank Performance? Evidence from the Eurozone

Ahmed Bouteska ()
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Ahmed Bouteska: University of Tunis El Manar, Faculty of Economics and Management of Tunis

Journal of Asset Management, 2020, vol. 21, issue 6, No 5, 535-548

Abstract: Abstract This study analyzed the effect of board structure characteristics on bank performance. Over a sample of 50 banks in five Eurozone countries, including the UK, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, during the period 2000–2019, our empirical evidence has suggested that most board characteristics increase bank performance, while the separation of the roles of CEO and chairman inhibits it. By using fixed effects and random effects regressions, as well as a pooled OLS panel data estimation, we have found that a board size of between 7 and 10 has a significant impact on bank performance. In addition to board size, we have also found that board independence has a positive and significant impact on bank performance. Furthermore, results have shown that the number of board meetings and financial experts plays an important role on bank performance. In contrast, there is no considerable increase in bank performance when the role of CEO and chairman is separated.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Board structure; Eurozone; Bank performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G20 G30 M14 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1057/s41260-020-00181-2

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