Ownership, governance mechanisms, and agency costs in China’s listed firms

Michael Firth, Peter M Y Fung and Oliver M Rui ()
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Oliver M Rui: Lingnan University

Journal of Asset Management, 2008, vol. 9, issue 2, No 4, 90-101

Abstract: Abstract Our study analyses the relations among agency costs, ownership structure, and governance mechanisms in Chinese listed firms. We find that firms with foreign shareholders incur higher agency costs. Legal person shareholders, our proxy for institutional investors, and government ownership have no impact on the level of agency costs. We also find that boards with a majority of outside directors are not associated with lower agency costs. There is some evidence that concentrated ownership is associated with lower agency costs. Although Chinese listed firms have engaged in ownership and governance reform, this has not manifested itself in a reduction in agency costs.

Keywords: agency costs; corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1057/jam.2008.13

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