Survey Article: Optimal Tautness and the Economics of Incentives in Bureaucracies

Michael Keren

Comparative Economic Studies, 1993, vol. 35, issue 1, 85-117

Abstract: This paper reviews the economic literature which deals with the tautness of plans and with its relevance to macroeconomic pressures in Soviet-type economies. It opens with a discussion of Kornai 's shortage economy, a systemic approach to pressure, which is an alternative to the plan-related tautness coined by Hunter, and deals tautness from the agency angle, both in a static framework and in a dynamic, ratchet-related, framework.

Date: 1993
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